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Prominent legal feminists, like Catherine MacKinnon, have promoted an understanding of 
rape, when it occurs during time of war and is targeted towards women, as constituting the crime 
of genocide. Thus an understanding of rape as genocide has been used by Mackinnon and others 
to call for intervention and recognition (MacKinnon, 1994) (Mackinnon C., 2006) Therefore, one 
of the most critical shifts in international law and human rights policy is the recognition that sexual 
violence is not merely incidental to war, but in fact an integral aspect of the conflict.  For instance, 
the conceptualization of rape as genocide, and as a weapon of war, has taken on legal significance. 
At the International Criminal Justice tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia rape has been prosecuted 
as a crime against humanity and genocide (Engle, 2007). Thus, the rise of international criminal 
law and its subsequent tribunals have been revered as effective mechanisms to prosecuting 
gendered acts of sexual violence that arise in the context of war, thus bringing attention to its 
victims (Engle, 2007). In this essay, through the judgments of the International Criminal Justice’s 
(ICJ), I examine how its tribunals reflect an understanding of rape as an instrument of the 
genocide.  I argue that the discourse of ‘rape as a weapon of war’, and the instrumentalization of 
sexual violence as being natural in an ethnic conflict, paradoxically makes the victims of violence 
largely invisible. In a sense, international law has reductionist logic in terms of what can be 
understood about the form of impact on the victims of gendered sexual violence, and its role in the 
PROSECUTING GENDERED VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: THE PARADOX OF WARTIME VIOLENCE 
 
 VOLUME 1 | 2016   P a g e  | 61 
 
 
genocide. I demonstrate how ‘rape as a weapon of war’ renders both male and female victims of 
violence in war invisible. 
When prosecuting gendered violence, the tribunal’s choice of recalling the “facts” of the 
account of sexual violence, of the victims, becomes about locating the violence as occurring in the 
realm of the larger inter-ethnic conflict. In this dominant narrative, of inter-ethnic conflict, men 
from one ethnic group are understood as subjecting women from another ethnic group to sexual 
abuse. The Rwandan genocide occurred over a period of three months, commencing on 6th April 
1994, when the plane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana was shot down, as it approached 
Kigali. The early events leading to the genocide began in 1990 when the Rwanda Patriotic Force 
(RPF), an army of expatriate Rwandans primarily of the Tutsi but also of the Hutu group, occupied 
Rwanda from Uganda. The consequential civil war continued throughout the early 1990s and 
became a significant “backdrop to the genocide” (Buss 147). The Rwandan genocide finished in 
July 1994 when government forces left the country and coerced more than a million Rwandan 
civilians to depart with them (Buss, 2009). In the hundred days of the genocide, an estimated 
800,000 Rwandans, primarily Tutsi were massacred.  
The United Nations Security Council in November 1994 created The International 
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, which was similar in function to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia (ICTY). The tribunal was established Arusha, Tanzania to hold those individuals 
accountable who had organized and participated in the genocide, and thus were liable for engaging 
in a crime against humanity.  The Rwandan Tribunal discovered that sexual violence was prevalent 
throughout Rwanda and ‘‘were committed with the speciﬁc intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a particular group’’ (Buss, 2009, p. 151), primarily the Tutsi ethnic group. Furthermore, the 
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tribunal stated the violence led to bodily and mental harm of women of Tutsi descent, their families 
and the Tutsi community as a whole. Hence rape was an essential tactic employed in this civil 
conflict and was targeted at Tutsi women, to ensure destruction of the Tutsi group (Buss, 2009) 
Significantly then, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as a post-
conflict mechanism can be seen as a site that utilizes a reductionist narrative for explaining 
women’s experiences of armed conflict. In this narrative, sexual violence is understood as 
occurring because ‘Hutu men who raped Tutsi women [did so] as a means to destroy the Tutsi 
community’ (Buss 160).  
Hence, as seen in the Rwanda Tribunal, at post-conflict trials the prosecution of rape 
becomes inherently connected to the larger context of violence: that is rape as a crime against 
humanity or rape as genocide. In other words, sexual assault in armed conflict, then, to be 
prosecuted under international law needs to be reflected as having occurred as ‘‘part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial 
or religious grounds’’ (Buss, 2009, p. 150).  Rape as genocide requires that the act of rape was 
‘‘committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group’’ (Buss, p. 150). Under both crimes, rape is “a crime against a collectivity” (Buss, p. 
150).  Hence, while rape as an offence in international law is recognized as constituting an “act of 
sexual violence against an individual”, it largely becomes constructed as harm against humanity 
through the prevailing ‘rape as genocide’ discourse; here the physical harm is viewed as targeting 
a community (Buss, 2009, p. 150).  In other words, the victim of sexual violence is re-categorized 
as a particular victim whose suffering denotes a communal narrative of pain (Buss, 2009).  
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For instance, the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) found Mikaeli 
Muhimana who was a counsellor in Kibuye, western Rwanda, guilty of partaking in and abetting 
rape as a crime against humanity. The Tribunal declared in its decision that the sexual violence 
occurred subsequently as a ‘‘discriminatory, widespread attack’’ against ‘‘a group of Tutsi 
civilians in Gishyita Commune, between the months of April and June 1994” (Buss, p. 150). 
Muhimana was convicted for having engaged in “acts of rape against women he believed were 
Tutsi” (Buss, 2009, p. 150).  However, it is irrelevant whether the women Muhimana raped were 
actually Tutsi, what matters is that he engaged in sexual violence against them knowing the 
violence constituted a “widespread and systematic attack’’ (Buss, 2009, p. 150) on an identifiable 
ethnic group i.e. the Tutsi community.  Hence the Tribunal found Muhimana ‘‘criminally liable 
for committing and abetting the rapes charged, as part of a widespread and systematic attack 
against a civilian population’’, that is, a crime against humanity (Buss, p. 150). Furthermore, in 
the much praised first decision in Akayesu, the Tribunal found that rapes were widespread, the 
accused knew of and aided and abetted in the rapes, and hence they ‘‘were committed with the 
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group’’, namely the Tutsi. The Tribunal 
held that the rapes led to the "physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families 
and their communities" (Buss, 2009, p. 151).  The destruction of the Tutsi community was seen as 
occurring specifically through the sexual victimization of the Tutsi women (Buss, 2009).  
Therefore, the Tribunal held that rape was used to commit the crime of genocide. The 
Rwanda Tribunal’s recognition that rape in the Rwandan Genocide “was a crime against humanity 
and/or an integral part of the genocide” resonates with several feminist theorists who reflect upon 
rape and other forms of wartime sexual violence “as instrumental to the larger conflict” (Buss, 
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2009, p. 151). Locating rape at the centre of the conflict—as an integral element of the violence—
is an important effort which allows us to recognize that violence is indeed gendered in nature. 
However, without minimizing the impact of communal suffering as a result of sexual violence, it 
is imperative to examine how this inter-ethnic narrative of sexual violence conveys “a limited 
conception of harm and the complex dimensions of violence” (Buss, 2009, p. 151) rendering 
invisible the various conditions that expose women to violence, and the distinct ways they take to 
negotiate, resist and cope with sexual abuse and death. 
Feminist scholarship and activism have effectively reflected the manner in which rape 
narratives have served as propaganda for constructing shifting conceptions of national self-
identity. More significantly, feminists and legal feminists have long been aware of the impact of 
calling particular situation genocide-or at least ethnic cleansing or a mass human rights violation. 
Invoking such language allowed feminists, for instance Catherine MacKinnon, Susan Brownmiller 
and Beverly Allen, to draw attention to rape as part of the overall violence, targeting a community, 
and as a result signaled that international legal recognition and military intervention needed to be 
implemented to prosecute violations of women’s rights matter (MacKinnon, 1994) (Brownmiller, 
1975) (Allen, 1996). Although these feminists were not primarily responsible for these 
interventions, they did play a crucial influence in advocating intervention for wartime sexual 
violence against women and thus for rape as genocide discourse. For instance, discussions 
regarding violence in Darfur showed how rape began to be spoken alongside and rather indistinctly 
from genocide to advocate for international criminal law intervention. The more rape was viewed 
as genocidal, the more those calling for international criminal law intervention invoked rape as a 
justification. However, speaking and framing of rape in this way frequently shifts the focus away 
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from the specific harm to women as a gender and instead serves to reflect the collective harm 
experienced in the Inter-ethnic conflict. (Engle, 2007). Despite the many visibilities of wartime 
sexual violence, violence against women in war continues to be generally invisible “as a matter of 
political and legal urgency” (Buss, 2009, p. 154).  Below, I demonstrate there is a relationship 
between rape that becomes hyper- visible, and “rendered paradigmatic’, and rape and sexual 
violence that consequently becomes invisible (Buss, 2009, p. 154).  
According to sociologist Avery Gordon, hyper-visibility is the phenomena that becomes 
the ‘‘persistent alibi for the mechanisms that render one un-visible’’ (Gordon, 1997).  Hence 
hyper-visibility then acts as a smokescreen to obscure the very existence of un-visibility. Clearly, 
discussing wartime sexual violence as being hyper-visible might instantly seem controversial and 
rather peculiar, especially when given the fact the Rwanda Tribunal’s record on sexual violence 
reflects the strikingly low conviction rate for rape or sexual violence (Buss, 2009). While 
international law’s invocation of rape as a weapon for genocide and as a signifier of atrocity is 
well intended, such an emphasis is problematic as it as a ‘homogenising’ tendency to construct 
sexual violence as inevitable in war. Hence this homogenisation obscures the individual accounts 
of rape victims. The result is that while violence against women and gender inequality is made 
visible and treated seriously within international law, it is a partial visibility. Ultimately, women 
appear and function in these decisions to reinforce “borders of group identity” (Buss, The Curious 
Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 2007, p. 13). For 
instance, the Furundzija (1995) case was significant for being the “first war crimes prosecution in 
which rape and sexual assault was the single charge” (Campbell, 2002, p. 150), and thus provided 
the first definition of the elements of the crime of rape in international humanitarian law, reflecting 
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how a victim’s experience of sexual violence can only find space if it is recalled in a way to 
reinforce the community-conflict narrative recognized by law (Campbell, 2002). The judgment in 
Furundzija affirmed that rape in armed conflict is a public wrong. Of course, normatively 
speaking, the acknowledgment of rape as not a crime against an individual, but rather a crime 
against humanity and hence a public wrong occurred because it constituted a violation “of 
universally accepted norms of international law” (Campbell, 2002, p. 155). This was essential in 
the Furundzija case because without this recognition the prosecution could not take place and there 
could no visibility of sexual assault in law.  
However, it is important to observe the significant distinction between the social space in 
which the individual experience of violence occurs “and the contemporary space in which it is (or 
is not) recalled” (Campbell, 2002, p. 155). Hence, victims of wartime sexual violence, in order to 
have their experiences represented and recognized at trial, are expected to speak of the violence in 
a way that ‘weaves’ fact into a community’s identity. In other words, a victim’s individual memory 
becomes transformed in international law as “collective memory” (Campbell, 2002, p. 155). 
Consequently, “collective memory survives and individual memory can find a place [, otherwise] 
it vanishes from collective memory and the possibility for individual memory is severely strained” 
(Campbell, 2002, p. 155). 
The individual narratives of victims become invisible partially because of the way crimes 
are defined and categorized in international law. Hence, the categorisation of war crimes under 
humanitarian law does not merely reflect and recognise the acts as having criminal intent, it offers 
a ‘grammar of pain’ (Buss, 2009, p. 155), i.e. a distinct and uniform language by which the tribunal 
can identify, and witnesses are permitted to testify to, their stories of violence. Consequently, this 
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categorisation of rape as a crime against humanity and as genocide, and the grammar of pain 
certain determine which types of narratives are recognized in court and which are excluded, and 
thus also which subjects are permitted to speak of the harms they have incurred (Buss, 2009). 
In international law the communal narratives triumph over the individual narrative and 
memory of the victim becomes possible through the grammar of pain. This grammar of pain is 
inherently gendered and consequently provides rules and structures to assign people to positions 
within a script of violence. Through this script of violence, rape and sexual violence comes to be 
constructed as a material aspect of women’s lives and thus are seen as being inevitable. The 
victimized female subject and her violator are situated in this script of violence and they 
subsequently emerge with their identities reconstructed to conform to the communal narrative of 
inter-ethnic conflict. Hence, in the script of violence created by the grammar of pain of 
international law, gender inequality becomes neutralized and women are then subjects who are 
‘inherently rapeable’ (Marcus, 1992, p. 388).  Thus, sexual violence is constructed as an instrument 
that ‘one side’ picks up and uses against the ‘other side’. In the scripted communal narrative, rape 
follows from the very existence of conflicts understood as occurring between two polarised ‘sides’. 
The prominence of the ‘grammar of pain’ and the violence script in international criminal law is 
reflected in the Rwandan Tribunal recognition of rape as an instrument of genocide. In this context, 
identities-males and females, Hutu and Tutsi groups- are placed into particular positions within 
the violent script and thus reconstructed through fixed and stable categories of victim and 
aggressor (Buss, 2009).  
The Rwandan Tribunal’s narrative of the rape script where Hutu men raped Tutsi women 
as a way to destroy the Tutsi community, while not inaccurate, provides an incomplete account of 
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the genocide and sexual violence. In the following discussion I reflect how difficulty arises in 
accepting this narrative when we begin to examine who are seen as victims and who aren’t, how 
violence against women is rooted in pre-conflict sexual and gender relations, and the resistance 
victims of wartime sexual violence demonstrate (Buss, 2009). The judgment in the Gacumbitsi 
case depicts some of the dynamics involved in seeing wartime sexual violence through the 
communal narrative that focuses on the ethnic dimensions of a conflict.  The former may of 
Rusumo in Eastern Rwanda Sylvestre Gacumbitsi was convicted for his contribution in 
orchestrating and participating in murder, rape, and extermination in the Rusumo commune during 
April, May and June 1994. Hence he was tried by the Rwandan Tribunal for genocide and crimes 
against humanity (Buss, 2007). This case reflects the reductionist logic inherent in international 
law’s construction of wartime sexual violence. The logic is firstly reductionist in nature due to its 
preoccupation of fixed or stable categories of victim and aggressor. More significantly, because 
there is a greater distortion at work in judgments like Gacumbitsi as they are partially explained 
by the overemphasis on ethnic affiliation as the dominant narrative within which the events in 
Rwanda are understood, which silences the individual narrative and memory of the victim.  
Individual Responsibility in International Law  
It is the commonly held belief that international criminal law, with its emphasis on 
individual criminal responsibility, is the suitable solution and mechanism to provide justice for 
instances of mass violence. Hence, when international criminal trials take on instances of mass 
violence, they are first and foremost a mechanism for establishing individual criminal 
responsibility for that violence (more precisely, they determine responsibility for specific acts or 
omissions defined as constituting war crimes). In this context, one or more individuals are 
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apprehended for violating principles of international criminal law. The post-conflict criminal trial 
represents an “effort to fix individual responsibility for history’s violent march” (Krever, 2013). 
Hence, the focus on individual criminal responsibility is widely understood not as a limitation of 
international criminal law, but as a key strength. However, as I reflect below, when contextualized, 
the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility contributes to rendering violence invisible 
(Krever, 2013, p. 712).  
Previously, perpetrators of mass violence could use the notion of state sovereignty as a 
justification for their actions.  Sovereignty as a legal concept allowed state leaders, under the 
principle of self-determination to govern their state in a manner they thought best, without any 
international or political interference.  However, such sovereignty of states has become qualified 
with the emergence of the “the new universalized rule of law” (Krever, 2013, p. 712) which is 
meant to regulate the actions of those state leaders who use their power to violate established 
international norms, regardless of whether or not they have chosen to adhere to such norms by 
formally becoming a member to an international law treaty. Thus this “universalized rule of law” 
represents “‘a moral conquest over the sovereign indifference of cold leviathans’” (Krever, 2013, 
p. 712) 
In the Gacumbitsi case, the Tribunal considered charges relating both to the defendant's 
role as an authority figure organizing murder, rape, and genocide, and his own role in individual 
acts of rape and murder. A critical aspect of the evidence was a speech the defendant gave on 17 
April 1994, in which he encouraged “the men of Rusumo to have sex with Tutsi ‘girls’ and, should 
the women refuse, to kill them ‘in an atrocious manner’” (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime 
Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, p. 13).  There were two distinct 
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difficulties that arose for the Tribunal in Gacumbitisi that need to be reflected upon. The first 
difficulty concerned his role for the rapes that occurred around the time of his speech; however, 
the Tribunal in Rwanda was unable to find complete evidence to convict him on the basis of such 
charges. These charges involved the rapes of witnesses ‘TAO’, ‘TAS’, ‘TAP’ and ‘TAP's mother’ 
(Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal 
Law, 2007, p. 13).  The defendant Gacumbitsi was eventually acquitted for the said charges.  He 
was found not responsible for the rape of these witnesses, because there was a lack of evidence 
linking his speech to the sexual violence; the prosecution could not establish a co-relation between 
the defendant's specific acts of encouragement on 17th April 1994 and the rapes of these women, 
all of which occurred near mid-April” (Buss, 2007). However, the tribunal did find that rapes of 
other women and girls did occur due to his speech as they occurred immediately after his 
“utterances” (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International 
Criminal Law, 2007, p. 14).  
The second difficulty, which is also difficult to reconcile, in this decision concerns one of 
above mentioned witness; ‘TAS’ who was actually a Hutu woman but was married to a Tutsi man. 
In her testimony she reported she was raped by two Hutu men while attempting to find a place to 
hide. One of her attackers stated that the defendant had given them orders to engage in sexual 
violence only against Tutsi women and girls, and that nothing had been decided regarding Hutu 
women married to Tutsi men. Yet these two men raped ‘TAS’ anyway. The ethnicity of ‘TAS’ 
becomes important here. Given she was of Hutu descent and not officially part of the Tutsi 
population; this challenged and disrupted the static and stable categories of rape that ‘one side’ 
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picks up to attack another (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity 
in International Criminal Law, 2007).  
In order to prove a crime against humanity, the prosecutor in Gacumbitisi was required not 
only provide of evidence of the rape, but also that the rape of ‘TAS’ occurred as a result of an 
attack against the Tutsi community, even despite the fact it was known to the tribunal she was of 
the Hutu ethnic group (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in 
International Criminal Law, 2007).  To counter this challenge to the inter-ethnic conflict narrative, 
fixated on collective memory, the tribunal ruled that “through the woman, it was her husband, a 
Tutsi civilian, who was the target” (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and 
Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 2007, p. 14). Thus, in a sense, to prevent her unique 
narrative from disrupting the dominant narrative present in the rape as genocide discourse, her rape 
was not recognized in the manner feminist sociologists have traditionally understood and made 
clear its nature i.e. a crime of power by men to dominate women and thus a crime embodying 
patriarchy. In such a conceptualization of rape the victim would be allowed to remain the subject 
of the abuse, however in Gacumbitisi ‘TAS’s’ was reconstructed “as a crime not against her 
person, but against her husband’s” (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and 
Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 2007, p. 14).  
Essentially, the Tribunal held that the rapes of witness TAS and the three other victims did 
occur, but were part of a widespread attack meant to destroy the Tutsi community.  It ruled that 
Gacumbitsi was not “specifically responsible for causing these rapes” (Buss, The Curious 
Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 2007, p. 14). The 
decision in this case reflects the complexities that arise when wartime sexual violence is only 
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examined through the inter-ethnic conflict narrative. Thus, while sexual violence was discussed 
by the Tribunal, systemic inequality of women remains invisible.  This is because the doctrine of 
individual criminal responsibility prevents International Criminal law from recognizing the 
victimization of women due to its preoccupation with fixed categories of specific crimes and 
individual criminal responsibility (Krever, 2013).  Clearly such a reductive understanding of 
violence is predictable within the world of the law, as it is primarily concerned with categories 
(Buss, 2007). 
Besides calling upon Hutu men to rape Tutsi girls, Gacumbitsi went further to specify that 
young Hutu men should be encouraged to rape “girls [who] had refused to marry [them]" (Buss, 
The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 
2007, p. 16). While the tribunal in its decision in Gacumbitsi does recount the evidence of several 
raped women and girls whose attackers specifically stated that the rapes were motivated by revenge 
for the women's refusal to marry the men, the tribunal’s decision fails to address and acknowledge 
marriage and rape as a type of revenge against Tutsi women. Such a discussion of what marriage 
meant for both the victims and aggressors serves as a crucial insight into the sexual economy in 
Rwanda which contributed to the conditions for the genocide that took place. But the tribunal’s 
focus on framing the violence through the lens of ethnic conflict allows the existence of this sexual 
economy to go largely unnoticed, and hence rendered invisible (Buss, 2007). 
In the sexual economy that paralleled the ethnic stratification in Rwanda, Tutsi women, at 
least symbolically, were idolized and highly sexualized. Tutsi women constituted social capital for 
Hutu men (Buss, 2007). Therefore, Tutsi women’s sexuality was central in the political 
propaganda used to build up and commence the Rwandan genocide. Constructed images of 
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dishonest and cunning Tutsi women were used to belittle the Tutsi group and subsequently to 
convince the Hutu group that the Tutsi were on the verge of conquering and killing them (Buss, 
2007). Furthermore, the Rwandan tribunal’s decisions are full of descriptions about the extreme 
gendered violence and torture that took place primarily against Tutsi women during the genocide. 
However, it is important to discuss that Hutu women were also raped and not merely because of 
their allegiance or sympathy with the Tutsi population or because they had married Tutsi men 
(Buss, 2007). Legal Studies scholar Doris E. Buss states that sexual violence against women in 
Rwanda needs to be understood, to an extent, in the context of men gaining ownership of property 
and assets (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International 
Criminal Law, 2007). Buss reflects that in Rwanda rapes were constructed as “marriages”; one of 
the key purposes of this was to gain access to assets that women possessed, including land and 
farming. This violence against women, under the veneer of “marriages” and other coercions to 
gain access to women’s assets, continued to occur after the Rwandan genocide had ended. 
However, there is little or no space at all in the inter-ethnic narrative, where one side picks up ‘rape 
as a weapon’ to attack the other side, to include a recognition of the role of the sexual and gendered 
economy that facilitated and marked the genocide (Buss, 2009). While the Rwanda Tribunals’ 
decisions recognize, to an extent, that the political propaganda leading up to the genocide exposed 
Tutsi women to particular violence, there is a lack of examination of the various ways in which 
gender complicated and intersected with ethnicity to create the circumstances under which 
particular forms of violence were enacted (Buss, 2009).  
Besides a lack of understanding of the sexual economy that was crucial in the build-up to 
the genocide, it is also important to examine how the resistance of victims in wartime violence 
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becomes downplayed in the inter-ethnic conflict narrative and the discourse of rape as a weapon 
of war. The identities of victims of violence, and the distinct ways in which they negotiate with 
and resist violence during war, is reflected in the story of Beatrice, a genocide survivor, who 
narrated her experience to journalist Lindsey Hilsum (Pottier, 2002). Beatrice and her daughter 
and son, aged 10 and 6, were Tutsi, living in the Muslim area of Kigali, since they had recently 
converted to Islam. Beatrice’s parents were from Zaire, the current Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) and hence she had a Zairean identity card. Along with a neighbour, a Tutsi woman 
named Laetitia (a pseudonym) and her baby, Beatrice and her children fled Kigali in the early days 
of the genocide. As they made their way to Rwanda’s south-western border, they were repeatedly 
harassed at check points and made to show their identity cards. To protect her, Beatrice altered 
Laetitia’s card to identify her as Hutu, but Laetitia was still raped at check stops. Because Beatrice 
had a Zairean identity card she was often let go and not subjected to violence, but nonetheless had 
to pay substantial sums of bribery money from the finances she had been allocated by her family. 
However, the neighbour Laetitia and her child were not that fortunate. And while Beatrice 
attempted to protect Laetita from violence through the funds she possessed, Laetitia was repeatedly 
raped. Furthermore, Beatrice’s daughter was extremely vulnerable at check points because she 
apparently had features that made her look like she was of Tutsi descent. As a result, Beatrice 
asked her friend Mamma Naima to take the son and daughter as her own. Thus, Beatrice parted 
company with her children and joined them later again in Cyangugu (Pottier, 2002). 
 Beatrice and her children survived the Rwandan genocide and the interviews she gave were 
done from Bujumbura, Burundi. Beatrice’s story demonstrates the limitation in talking about 
wartime sexual gendered violence through the lens of the grammar of pain in which sexual 
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violence (as a legally recognized harm) occurs from the very existence of conflicts taking place 
between two polarized sides. In this sense, we can understand how Beatrice’s narrative of how she 
negotiated the risk of violence and being violated disrupts the construction of the violence script 
utilized in international law to frame ethnic identities as always being fixed and stable. Beatrice’s 
story emphasizes the significance of various other aspects of social position that influence, together 
with ethnic identity, an individual’s vulnerability to violence (Pottier, 2002). 
Beatrice’s narrative clearly demonstrates that individuals targeted for attack are likely to 
have been victimized for multiple reasons, rather than merely their ethnic affiliation. Hence, 
Beatrice’s experience of the genocide was determined by several factors, including who she was 
and what resources she had available. Because she was recognized as being Zairean, she was not 
limited to the Tutsi category and this gave her a degree of protection from violence. Furthermore, 
when she fled and was stopped at checkpoints, she belonged to a Muslim community in a 
predominantly Christian country. She was resourceful in terms of her finances and friends, and she 
was helped by Hutu friends and strangers. While at the time she managed to resist the violence, as 
evident from her narrative, however she also suffered greatly and died in 1998 (Pottier, 2002). 
However, what I have meant to emphasise in my discussion above is that Beatrice’s narrative is 
an example of a victim of wartime violence who cannot simply be categorized into the stable and 
unchanging category of the “Tutsi” victimized subject of the Rwandan tribunal. Her Zairean 
nationality was more significant in her interaction with some of her potential attackers. 
Furthermore, another aspect of her identity was being Muslim which allowed her to form and 
maintain vital links with friends and neighbours that were crucial to her survival and the steps she 
took to minimize the risk to herself and her children (Pottier, 2002). 
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 The purpose of this preceding discussion has been to demonstrate that international law’s 
overt focus on the instrumentalization of rape, or as weapon during wartime that one side utilizes 
to eliminate and conquer the other, renders the narratives of women invisible. While the persistent 
recognition of rape as an instrument of the genocide may rightfully so act as signifier of atrocity, 
it simultaneously works to obscure the individual accounts of sexual violence as well as who is 
considered to fit the victim category. In this part of my essay, I discuss gendered assumptions 
regarding wartime violence in international law.  
Sexual violence in wartime has been typically understood as an issue affecting 
women.  Even those authors who admit that men are also raped often discuss it in a manner that 
minimizes its importance: “Yes, men do get raped, but it is usually by other men and it happens 
less frequently than is the case for women,” claims Sara Sharatt (1999, p. 80), speaking on the 
Foca Indictment at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, a 
report from the Liu Institute claims -without reference to systematic data- that, while men may be 
more likely to be killed than women, women are far more vulnerable to sexual violence (Liu-
Institute, 2005) R. Charli Carpenter, in interviews he carried out with humanitarians from 2001 to 
2003, was often told that women comprised the vast majority of rape victims, but these same 
practitioners told him they were unaware of any data collected that assessed the extent of men’s 
vulnerability to sexual assault (Carpenter, 2006). Despite the tendency to treat sexual violence as 
a war crime whose victims are only female subjects, “men and boys have historically been and 
continue to be targeted for sexual violence in particular and gender-specific ways that deserve the 
attention of the human rights community” (Carpenter, 2006). In my discussion here, I aim to draw 
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attention to how men are rendered invisible as victims of gendered and sexual violence by 
international criminal law.  
According to Carpenter, the predominant types of sexual violence against men and older 
boys include a combination of rape and sexual mutilation. The ritual castration of male prisoners 
and enslavement of adolescent boys along with women for sexual purposes has historically been 
a prevalent feature of warfare (Carpenter, 2006). The ideological basis of these acts of violence is 
reflected in how these acts are physically and symbolically meant to deprive these males of their 
self-concept as men and to ‘feminize’ them; this is achieved through rape which is seen as the 
ultimate way to eliminate a male’s dignity as a man and through castration as way to deprive him 
of his manhood (Carpenter, 2006). 
During times of armed conflict, together with other forms of torture, crimes against the 
bodily integrity of men are widespread in detention settings. Carpenter discusses several cases of 
sexual assault against men during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, chiefly in detention camps, 
and these acts included castration, circumcision and other forms of sexual mutilation; in many 
cases, prisoners were coerced to engage in sexual acts with the guards or with other prisoners, and 
forced into torturing and mutilating other male prisoners. One scenario involved prisoners being 
lined up naked while Serb women from outside undressed in front of them; if any prisoner had an 
erection, they would be castrated; another ex-detainee told of suffering electric shocks as 
punishment for experiencing arousal (Carpenter, 2006). Besides being subjected to such 
humiliation and mutilation, men are likely to be “raped anally in detention or forced to sexually 
service male guards” (Carpenter, 2006, p. 95).  
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International law has failed to recognize sexual and gendered violence against men as 
constituting sexual violence during wartime and armed conflict. For instance, although sexual 
mutilation of men was reported in the context of the Bosnian concentration camps, it has not been 
prosecuted as rape or sexual violence at the Hague tribunal, instead merely seen as ‘torture’ or 
‘degrading treatment’ with no acknowledgment of the inherent gendered nature of the violence 
meant to explicitly target the bodily integrity and self-concept of the men victimized (Carpenter, 
2006). The invisibility of men as victims of sexual violence largely results from International 
Law’s script of violence.  This script provides the content of the dominant wartime narrative which 
is spoken through a “gendered grammar of violence” (Marcus, 1992, p. 392).  Ultimately, through 
the gendered grammar of violence that emerges in the prosecution of war crimes, gender and 
gendered violence become “synonymous only with women” (Carpenter, 2006).  Hence, through 
the script of violence, men and women are constructed as stable a category which reifies an 
“essentialized notion of women as victims and men as perpetrators” (Carpenter, 2006, p. 99).   
This essentiliazing notion in international law is largely rooted in assumptions about male 
wartime roles. These gendered assumptions impact both how the identities of men and women are 
constructed in the decisions of the tribunals. For example, while clearly there is no doubt what 
happened in Srebrenica in Bosnia is constituted as genocide; in the Krstic decision the Tribunal 
instills a problematic understanding of gender in order to determine its ruling.  In this decision 
gender emerges as a “static, almost self-evident” category. In the Prosecutor’s analysis, women 
are constructed as merely being the biological reproducers and as signifiers of the patriarchal 
aspects of their community, as opposed to being individuals with agency. The fixed category of 
men as perpetrators in war, and thus outside the realm of the civilian population, which includes 
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women and children, emerged as a result of their mass recruitment in the army in the early modern 
period. As a result, since military institutions became male-dominated, the image of the ‘able-
bodied adult male’ arose in the public perception and in the militarized state (Carpenter, 2006). 
Hence, gender hierarchy and relations came to be constructed through the allocation of power to 
weapon-bearing men as the guardians of frail and feeble women, who required their protection 
(Carpenter, 2006).  This gender hierarchy continues to force men into military service through 
actual and threatened physical violence. And thus “masculinized military institutions” in turn 
reinforce gender hierarchies, as women are excluded from the bearing of arms, and as 
disproportionate number of male soldiers generate the image of a “masculinized nation-at-arms” 
voluntarily ready (rather than coerced) to fight (Carpenter, 2006). Consequently, this hierarchical 
order of gender relations infiltrates into international law, which then locates them in the category 
of the perpetrator of violence.  Hence, due to international law’s preoccupation with categories, 
the identities of men and women are essentialized; the former are constituted as inherently being 
aggressive and prone to violence and the latter are constituted as being defenseless, perpetual 
victims and ‘inherently rapeable’ (Marcus, 1992, p. 388). 
One of the most convincing examples of International law’s essentializing process of fixed 
gender identities in wartime, is the gendered way the concept of the ‘civilian’ has been constructed 
in international law. Because international’s law recognizes men solely as aggressors, in conflict 
situations it consequently makes them appear, in a sense, existing outside the civilian population. 
This in turn leads to the perception that men of an ethnic and/or age demographic are always 
potential threats. Consequently, then, this perception encourages sex-selective patterns of atrocity 
against even those men who manage to remain in the civilian sector, and resist fighting. This 
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transpires when codified laws requiring belligerents to distinguish between combatants and 
civilian on the basis of a person’s actual participation in war are, in fact, interpreted according to 
the use of sex as a means to recognize the enemy (Carpenter, 2006). Evidently, then, gendered 
assumptions about wartime roles explain this tendency in conflict zones, and continue to be 
reinforced by international law in post-conflict trials where men are only recognized as 
perpetrators, thus rendering violence against men, which includes sexual violence and sex-
selective massacre, invisible.  
International Law’s construction of violence as primarily “the product of an inter-ethnic 
conflict” fails to consider how it is influenced by other social, political and economic structures. 
For instance, in the Rwanda Tribunal’s decision “all sexual violence is reduced to the equation of 
‘Hutu men who raped Tutsi women as a means to destroy the Tutsi community’” (Buss, 2009, p. 
160). Hence the Tribunal’s decision frames the violence against women occurring primarily as a 
way to eliminate an ethnic group; the Tutsi community. However, as observed by anthropologist 
Jennie Burnet, it is more so men, and thus not women, who are seen to embody ethnicity (Burnet, 
2009). Hence, destroying an ethnic group often is seen achievable through the elimination of its 
male members, while women can be appropriated into the ethnic identity of the attacking group. 
While I recognize that this observation only is relevant to cases where target groups were defined 
according to ethnicity, it does hold relevance in such contexts as the Rwandan Genocide. In 
Rwanda, Hutu attackers took some Tutsi women as their wives, after their husbands and children 
had been killed (Carpenter, 2006). Furthermore, according to a 1995 African Rights Report, Hutu 
sympathisers convinced the Hutu attackers to spare women because they did not denote ethnicity; 
‘the bad ones were men’ and female survivors reported being told they were safe because ‘sex has 
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no ethnic group’ (African-Rights, 1995a). While I do not dispute that women were severely 
victimized which reflected a shared pattern of sexual violence, the possibility that men would have 
also been targeted to eliminate a community disrupts International law’s reduction of the Rwandan 
Genocide as primarily Hutu men who harmed Tutsi women.  
Wartime sexual violence “is treated as relatively uniform in practice and experience” 
(Buss, 2009, p. 155) due to fixed and stable constructions of gender identity i.e. aggressor (men) 
and victim (women). This focus on shared patterns of violence, against women or women of a 
distinct ethnic group by men, provides the content of the communal narrative and subsequently 
renders the inconsistencies and exceptions to this very narrative, which are present in the memory 
of victims, largely invisible (Buss, 2009). Furthermore, this pre-occupation with fixed gender 
identities also determines who gets to be recognized as a victim of wartime violence. Particularly 
female victims must find space within the role of the ‘inherent rapeable’ subject who is vulnerable 
to violence during wartime and male victims are unlikely to have their narrative of sexual violence 
recognized as gendered violence, in International law.  
This clearly has been the case with Beatrice’s own narrative of violence as a female victim, 
mentioned previously in this essay; the resources and connections she had influenced her survival, 
also it is possible that she was able to resist violence, possibly because the Hutu attackers might 
have seen as her not representing ethnicity (Pottier, 2002). The fact that some Tutsi women were 
taken as ‘wives’, while still an indication they were sexually violated and treated as claimed 
property by Hutu men, provides us with insights about the pre-existing sexual economy in Rwanda 
where Tutsi women as mistresses were recognized as social capital (Buss, The Curious Visibility 
of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 2007). Gaining access to 
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women’s bodies through “marriage” also allowed men access to the assets they owned including 
land and farming. Yet, in the inter-ethnic narrative in which victims are located, and where sexual 
violence is spoken of through an almost dictated rape script; where one side picks up ‘rape as a 
weapon’ to attack the other side (Buss, 2009), there is no room to include the context of the sexual-
gendered economy that was crucial to the momentum the genocide took in Rwanda. Paradoxically, 
the hyper-visibility of wartime sexual violence through the inter-ethnic conflict narrative renders 
invisible - or at least invisible a significant factor of - women’s systemic inequality.  
The rigid focus on the generalised pattern of rape can lead to an essentializing narrative in 
which wartime sexual violence is treated as seemingly inevitable. An alternative approach to 
treating gendered violence as relatively similar with fixed gender identities, as dictated by the rape 
script in International law, can be found by examining the unique narratives of victims. Beatrice’s 
story allows us to explore the various circumstances that exposed her to violence and the brave 
steps she took to resist rape and death (Buss, 2009). It is at this level of detail, with all the 
inconsistencies and complexities revealed, that it becomes possible to imagine a situation where 
women are not seen as ‘inherently rapeable’ (Marcus, 1992, p. 388) beings but as individuals who 
have resilience and thus negotiate, interact, and resist the systemic inequality they live with and 
the sexual economy they are part of (Buss, 2007). Furthermore, in post-conflict trials when women 
are seen as “always raped”, all men are only recognized as perpetrators, and instances involving 
men as victims of rape, sexual mutilation, and mass killings are not recognized under gendered 
violence, despite the sex-selective nature of these acts (Carpenter, 2006).  
International law embodies reductionist logic in terms of what can be spoken and 
understood about the impact on the victims of gendered sexual violence, and its role in the 
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genocide.  Rape as a ‘weapon of war’ renders both male and female victims of violence in war 
invisible, as it depicts violence “exclusively as the product of an inter-ethnic conflict rather than 
considering how other social political and economic structures shaped the violence and genocide” 
(Buss, 2009, p. 160). Pinpointing rape at the centre of the conflict—as an integral element of the 
violence—is an important effort which allows us to recognize that violence is indeed gendered in 
nature. However, without minimizing the impact of communal suffering as a result of sexual 
violence, it is essential to observe how this inter-ethnic narrative of sexual violence conveys a 
partial account of the violence. Hence, in international law the communal narrative’s triumph over 
the individual narrative and memory of the victim becomes possible through ‘the grammar of 
pain’. This grammar of pain is inherently gendered and consequently provides rules and structures 
to assign people to positions within a script of violence. Furthermore, when wartime sexual 
violence “is treated as relatively uniform in practice and experience” (Buss, 2009, p. 155), the 
focus on shared patterns of violence provides the content of the collective memory of suffering, 
which renders exceptions and variances found in the narratives of individual men and women 
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